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Abstract 
 
European citizenship consisting of equal economic, social, and political rights for all 
EU citizens has come under pressure in recent years due to the different crisis the EU 
had to face. Based on a survey conducted in 13 EU member states we examined to 
what extent EU-citizens support the notion that citizens from other European countries 
should enjoy the same rights as nationals. Overall, only 56 % of EU citizens support 
the idea that EU foreigners and national citizens should be treated equally. In addition, 
we find remarkable variations between the countries. Multivariate analysis indicates 
that cultural factors on the individual and the country level have a strong impact on 
attitudes towards Europeanised equality, whereas structural factors that are related to 
individuals’ and a countries’ socioeconomic position are only of minor importance. 
One can conclude from our findings that the EU is not only situated in an institutional 
but also in a legitimacy crisis.  
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Introduction 
When flying from a non-European country to one of the member states of the Euro-
pean Union (EU), the passengers approaching the passport control are divided into 
two groups; those with an EU passport and those with non-EU passports queue in 
separate lines. The burgundy colored European passports are a symbolic expression 
of European citizenship. Every EU citizen is allowed to move, settle, and work in any 
EU member state, and owns a set of political rights, particularly the right to vote and 
to stand as a candidate for municipal elections in the member state of residence. Fi-
nally, freedom of movement includes the entitlement to the same social security bene-
fits as national citizens. By establishing a European citizenship consisting of equal eco-
nomic, social, and political rights, the European Union has replaced the nation-state 
concept of equality with the idea of a Europe-wide equality for all European citizens. 
However, the legal institutionalization of Europeanized equal rights is only one side 
of European integration, because legal regulations ultimately require the citizens to 
believe in the legitimacy of the regulations. In the case of European citizenship, this 
legitimacy has come under pressure in recent years. Since 2010, the EU has found itself 
in the greatest crisis since its emergence. The Eurozone crisis, the sovereign debt crisis, 
the economic crisis, the refugee crisis, and Brexit have all not only challenged the Eu-
ropean integration process as a whole, but also the idea that all EU citizens should 
have the same rights. One of the main reasons why a majority of Britons voted to leave 
the European Union was that they did not want other EU citizens, especially from 
Eastern Europe, to have the right to live and work in the UK (Hobolt, 2016). The idea 
of equal rights has also been questioned in other European countries. Several countries 
tried to deny or reduce social benefits for EU migrants, either through legislation or in 
practice.1 Euroskeptic parties have increased in importance in many EU member 
states. In their eyes, the nation-state and not the EU is the true sovereign; and thus 
sovereignty rights should be returned from EU institutions to the member states, bor-
ders between them should be controlled, and the number of migrants coming from 
outside and inside Europe should be reduced (Brack and Startin, 2015).  
In contrast, left and cosmopolitan parties, as well as center-left politicians, have de-
fended the idea of European citizenship. E.g. French president Emmanuel Macron said 
‘We can no longer choose to turn inwards within national borders; this would be a collective 
                                                 
 
1 In January 2019, the Austrian government introduced a new legislation, which reduces family benefits 
and family tax reductions for EU migrants to the level of the country in which the children reside, alt-
hough the parent(s) live and work in Austria. In reaction to this legislation, the EU launched an infringe-
ment procedure against Austria, arguing that it breaks with the non-discrimination rule of the European 
Union. Sources: https://www.courthousenews.com/ireland-cant-hinge-family-benefits-on-employ-
ment-status/ (last access: 26.02.2019); http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-19-664_en.htm (last 
access: 26.02.2019). In the case of Ireland, the European Court of Justice ruled in February 2019 that the 
withholding of family benefits for an unemployed Romanian immigrant collides with EU legislation. 
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disaster.2 One can assume that not only politicians but also citizens are divided into two 
camps and thus constitute a new cleavage structure. Some might consider themselves 
at risk as a result of European equality, open borders and EU migration. For others, 
European citizenship opens up new opportunities to go abroad or to take advantage 
of EU migrants as workers paid below the national average wage level. 
Against this backdrop, we examine to what extent citizens oppose or support the no-
tion that EU migrants should enjoy the same rights as themselves within their nation-
state. Drawing on the literature on attitudes towards migration on the one hand and 
on cleavage theory on the other, we attempt to explain differences in peoples’ attitudes 
within and between countries. In an original survey conducted in 2016 in 13 EU mem-
ber states, we asked respondents whether they support the notion that EU migrants 
should be permitted to vote in local elections, should be allowed to work in their coun-
try, and should receive the same social security benefits as nationals. 
Survey results show that only 56 percent of respondents support the idea that EU 
migrants and national citizens should be treated equally. In addition, we revealed a 
remarkable variation between countries: Whereas in eight countries a majority is in 
favor of European citizenship, people from Hungary, Slovakia, and the Republic of 
Cyprus oppose this idea. Multivariate analysis indicates that ideational factors on both 
the individual and the country level have a strong impact on attitudes, whereas 
structural factors related to an individual’s and a country’s socioeconomic position are 
only of minor importance. Anti-cosmopolitan attitudes, political right-wing 
orientations, identification with the nation-state and the strength of anti-immigrant 
parties in a country are the most important factors explaining attitudes towards 
European citizenship. These findings lead us to conclude that the EU is not only in an 
institutional but also in a legitimacy crisis.  
 
From national to European citizenship 
European societies of the 19th and 20th century are generally characterized as nation-
state societies. Alongside the creation of national institutions, people who live within 
a territory of a specific nation-state became citizens of that nation-state. As a result, 
non-members (i.e. members of other nation-states), were excluded and thus treated 
differently. For British sociologist Thomas H. Marshall, the reinforcement of national 
citizenship status is one of the most significant preconditions for intrastate social in-
clusion (Marshall, 1949/1983).  
                                                 
 
2 Source: https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/english_version_transcript_-
_initiative_for_europe_-_speech_by_the_president_of_the_french_republic_cle8de628.pdf; (last access: 
15.09.2019). 
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However, the European integration process has not only changed the institutional set-
tings of the EU member states, but has also transformed the notion of citizenship. In-
stitutionalizing a European citizenship status means to provide equal rights to every 
EU citizen, regardless of the EU country they come from or reside in. Firstly, open 
access is granted to all national labor markets within the EU for all EU citizens (Maas, 
2007). Secondly, since the Maastricht Treaty, the EU has guaranteed a number of fun-
damental political rights for all EU citizens (freedom of speech and assembly, right of 
petition, freedom of association, and the right to elect the European Parliament) under 
the umbrella of ‘EU citizenship’. These rights also include the right to vote and to stand 
as a candidate for municipal elections in the member state of residence. Thirdly, free-
dom of movement appends additional rights, which are connected to welfare privi-
leges (Ferrera, 2005; Bruzelius and Seeleib-Kaiser, 2017; Seeleib-Kaiser and Pennings, 
2018), including the entitlement to the same social security and tax benefits as nation-
als, as well as the right to subsidized housing. According to these rights, every foreign 
EU employee is entitled to live with their family, and the family is entitled to receive 
the same family allowances as nationals. 
Although these European citizenship rights have been in effect for decades, they have 
rarely been used in a practical manner until their extension to the citizens of the new 
member states from Central and Eastern Europe in the 2000s, and the subsequent eco-
nomic and political crises in several European member states (Vasilopoulou and Talv-
ing, 2018). In the years after, intra-EU migration increased, especially from poorer to 
richer EU countries. Between 2008 and 2012, the number of citizens working in another 
country than their birth country rose by 14 percent (see Eurofound, 2014; Vasilopoulou 
and Talving, 2018). From 2013-16, the share of people living in another EU country 
increased by an additional five to seven percent every year, resulting in a total number 
of 11,8 million EU migrants of working age, which constitutes a total share of around 
four percent of the working-age population in the EU-28 in 2016 (European Commis-
sion, 2018a). Despite this still relatively low level, intra-EU migration gained political 
salience, especially within the frame of Euroskeptic sentiments, as the discussion 
around the Brexit referendum shows (Vasilopoulou and Talving, 2018). Based on data 
over the span of the last 140 years, Funke et al. (2016) show that financial and economic 
crises have led to political polarization, including an increase in the number of votes 
for far-right parties with nationalistic and xenophobic tendencies. Additionally, from 
2015 on, Europe experienced a rapid increase in the number of asylum seekers in the 
EU, especially those from Middle Eastern countries, which might also have affected 
European citizens’ general attitudes towards migration, and intra-EU migration and 
the permeability of borders. These developments culminate in the current situation, in 
which the legitimacy of European citizenship is being contested in the public sphere, 
especially by Euroskeptic parties. 
There have been several studies examining the acceptance of Europeanized equality, 
while focusing on different aspects of the concept. To begin with, in the Eurobarometer 
(EB) surveys different questions have been used to measure attitudes towards Euro-
pean citizenship rights. According to the Standard EB 89 (Spring 2018), 58 percent of 
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all respondents think that free movement of people, goods and services is the most 
positive result of the integration process (European Commission, 2018c). The Special 
EB 477 (September 2018) survey shows that 40 percent of the respondents agreed to 
the statement that EU foreigners, who stand as candidates in municipal elections, 
should have the same rights as all other elected candidates, while another 23 percent 
agreed to the same statement but excluded the right to become mayor (European Com-
mission, 2018b). Measuring attitudes toward active suffrage, however, was not part of 
Special EB 477. 
Vasilopoulou and Talving (2018) analyzed EU citizens’ attitudes towards the freedom 
of movement in the EU, based on EB data from 2015-17. The authors find an overall 
approval rate of 82 percent for the freedom of movement. In their analysis, a respond-
ent’s high social status, a low identification with the nation-state, as well as living in a 
less affluent country (measured by the country’s GDP) have significant positive effects 
on the acceptance of freedom of movement. Additionally, they revealed several inter-
action effects between a country’s economic situation on the one hand and individual 
characteristics on the other: The individual effects only manifest themselves in richer 
countries, whereas in poorer countries, approval does not substantially vary between 
social status and identification (Vasilopoulou and Talving, 2018).  
Using data from a survey conducted in six EU countries in 2016, Ferrera and Pellegrata 
(2018) reveal that in five out of six countries, citizens who are more vulnerable to eco-
nomic and symbolic threats generated by the free movement of EU workers are more 
likely to oppose European equality on the labor market. They also show that country 
characteristics mediate the relationship between socioeconomic status, experiences of 
relative deprivation and interpersonal relations on the one hand and attitudes toward 
the free movement of EU migrants on the other (Ferrera and Pellegrata, 2018). 
Although the notion of freedom of movement is in the very heart of the four freedoms, 
mechanisms revealed by Vasilopoulou and Talving (2018) and Ferrara and Pellegrata 
(2018) do not necessarily apply to the political and social dimension of European citi-
zenship rights, as they only cover two out of the three rights that constitute European 
citizenship. None of the studies applies a concept consisting of multiple equality 
rights, as discussed above. Furthermore, items used by EB surveys have been formu-
lated in a very broad manner. Studies show that respondents often deviate from their 
value beliefs if they anticipate costs and unpleasant consequences (Diekmann and 
Preisendörfer, 2003). The items used by Eurobarometer specify general attitudes to-
wards equality rights only, and do not consider that the perception of potential (nega-
tive) consequences of applying these rights may change the respondents answering 
behavior. Therefore, the results might be biased towards greater approval, when com-
paring them to items that introduce individual costs to the equation. 
Acting on this critique, in previous studies we tried to ascertain which values people 
‘really’ believe in by adding potential negative consequences of the idea of a Europe-
wide equality to the measurement of attitudes toward European citizenship. In a four-
country survey conducted in Poland, Spain, Germany and Turkey (as a candidate 
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country of the EU) in 2009, we examined the three European citizenship dimensions 
separately (Gerhards and Lengfeld, 2015). We found relatively high approval rates, 
varying between 57 to 79 percent depending on the country and the dimension of Eu-
ropean citizenship in all three EU countries. Only in Poland, passive suffrage was not 
supported by a majority of respondents (48 percent). Additionally, we found that citi-
zens from the three EU countries surveyed made a difference between EU and Non-
EU migrants: When being asked for granting economic rights to Turks and migrants 
from Northern America, approval rates were significantly lower, compared to EU mi-
grants. Findings also show that materialist and nationalist values and fear of foreign 
domination of the national culture were the most powerful explanatory factors, 
whereas the respondent’s level of education and their social status were of minor im-
portance. However, these studies were conducted prior to the main European crises 
as outlined above, and included three European countries only. Thus, it is not clear 
whether the results are still valid today and can be generalized to the rest of Europe 
(Gerhards and Lengfeld, 2015). 
In summary, the literature generally finds a majority of supporters of European citi-
zenship. However, these surveys either relied on too broad items, or were conducted 
at a time when there were only very few intra-EU migrants, no major financial crises 
and before immigration became one of the most important media topics. Our paper 
aims to close these research gaps pointed out in this section by examining all three 
components of European citizenship (civil, political and social rights) with data from 
a survey conducted in 13 European countries in 2016 and by making use of items, 
which consider the potential costs of granting rights to EU foreigners. 
 
Explaining attitudes towards European citizenship 
Referring to Ferrera (2005: 229), we argue that the opening up of national borders over 
the course of the past decades challenged the peoples’ traditional symbolic code of 
equality. This process accelerated in recent years in Europe, potentially leading to a 
backlash against the now more widely used equality rights. In addition to a potential 
cultural conflict, Ferrera (2005: 229) assumes that the implementation of the idea of a 
Europeanized equality will ‘disturb the existing distribution of material resources and 
life chances among natives’. Those Europeans being in a weak economic position 
might interpret migrants as a threat whereas highly educated citizens belonging to a 
higher social class may perceive Europeanized equality as something, which is in line 
with their cosmopolitan values and as an additional opportunity for their life chances. 
Along similar lines, Kriesi and colleagues assume that rising competition and the entry 
of cultural ‘outsiders’ will mobilize the objections of insiders (Kriesi et al., 2012; Hutter 
et al., 2016). These considerations lead to the question if there is still a majority of Eu-
ropeans supporting European citizenship after the economic and political crises and 
the subsequent rise in intra-EU migration. 
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In order to explain attitudes towards European citizenship, we rely on broader theo-
retical arguments explaining attitudes towards immigration and on the theory of social 
cleavages (Ferrera 2005; Hutter et al., 2016; Kriesi et al. 2012). In cases where specific 
attitudes coincide with respondents’ structural characteristics and more abstract value 
beliefs, social cleavages consisting of supporters and opponents are likely to emerge. 
According to Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007), there are two main strands of argumen-
tation: On the one hand, structural explanations concerning the economic interest, 
which are frequently applied by examining the impact of the skill-level, employment 
position and wages on immigration-related attitudes. On the other hand, value based 
explanations focusing on traits like racial tolerance, preferences for cultural diversity, 
self-identification and political attitudes (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007: 402–406).3 We 
follow this classification by differentiating between structural factors (1) and ideational 
factors (2), influencing attitudes on both the individual level (a) and the country level 
(b).4 
(1) Structural factors: The provision of equal civil, political and social rights may coun-
ter individual and collective interests emerging from socioeconomic traits. According 
to social threat-theory (Blalock, 1967; Callens et al., 2015; Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010; 
Schlueter and Scheepers, 2010), we assume that native citizens perceive immigrants 
first and foremost as competitors for scarce resources. On average, EU migrants have 
a lower educational level and higher unemployment rates compared to the local pop-
ulation.5 Hence, they are more dependent on welfare state provisions and will more 
                                                 
 
3 Although we use causal rhetoric throughout our argumentation, our analysis is not causal in a narrow 
sense. To strictly test for causality, a randomized trial (Hernán, 2018) or panel data (Morgan and Win-
ship, 2014: 363–391) is required. Unfortunately, our cross sectional survey data cannot be categorized as 
such. Nonetheless, we share the opinion of Miguel A. Hernán who argues that ‘without causally explicit 
language, the means and ends of much observational research get hopelessly conflated’ (Hernán, 2018: 
617). 
4 There are other factors, such as different characteristics of migrants, which may influence citizens' 
attitudes towards EU migrants; unfortunately, our data set does not contain information about different 
characteristics of migrants. Hjorth (2016) conducted a survey experiment in Sweden randomizing expo-
sure to cues about recipients’ country of origin and family size. Results show that for Swedish respond-
ents, a Bulgarian EU migrant is less entitled to child benefits than a Dutch migrant. In addition, results 
indicate that the higher the number of children the lower the agreement that an EU migrant should 
receive the same child benefits as a Swedish citizen. In a similar vein, Reeskens and van der Meer (2019) 
argue that different criteria of deservingness impact on whether people think that refugees should re-
ceive unemployment benefits or not. Based on a survey vignette experiment conducted in the Nether-
lands, results show that a refugee’s country of origin, his labor market reintegration behavior and his 
culpability for his unemployment are the most important conditions for reduced solidarity. 
5 Sources: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Migrant_integration_sta-
tistics_-_education#Educational_attainment (last access: 28.02.2019). 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Migrant_integration_statis-
tics_%E2%80%93_labour_market_indicators (last access: 28.02.2019). 
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likely put pressure on less high-skilled citizens in the job market. At this point, com-
petition might occur between EU migrants on the one side and natives who are simi-
larly dependent on state benefits or who perform low-skilled jobs on the other side.  
However, the assumption about competition with low-skilled EU migrants does not 
hold true for all countries. Eurostat data shows that in some countries, the proportion 
of people with low educational degrees is much lower in the EU migrant population 
than in the national population, whereas in other countries the two groups exhibit an 
equal distribution of educational attainment.6 Accordingly, we include assumptions 
about the interaction between an individual’s position and the country specific context 
of educational composition of the EU migrant population. 
(1a) Micro-level: We assume that those in a lower socioeconomic position (in terms of 
employment status, occupational class and educational attainment) might fear that al-
lowing EU migrants to work and receive social benefits in their country will lead to 
increased competition and thus a decrease in wages and social benefits. This argument 
is also in line with the ‘losers of modernization’ thesis (Betz, 1994, 2003), which says 
that low status nationals are more likely to show xenophobia and prefer nationalist 
values, and thus constitute the electoral base for right-wing anti-immigration parties. 
By contrast, the self-employed and owners of bigger businesses could benefit from in-
creased labor supply. The same holds true for academics that might perceive the open-
ing of labor markets as a chance for their own mobilities. Previous studies have shown 
that in most countries the less educated and the low skilled tend to be more negatively 
predisposed towards migrants (Bobo and Licari, 1989; Chandler and Tsai, 2001; Card 
et al., 2012; Citrin et al., 1997; Ferrera and Pellegrata, 2018; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 
2007). We expect this effect to apply to EU migrants as well. 
Explaining attitudes towards intra-EU migration is also connected to the discussion 
about the causes of electoral success of right-wing populist parties. Some authors ar-
gue that the fear of economic hardship and status loss typically affects insiders of the 
labor market, especially members of the lower middle class, who in response vote for 
right-wing populist parties (Kurer, 2017; Mutz, 2018). Because these are typically anti-
immigrant and Euroskeptic parties, we apply this argument to European citizenship, 
expecting not only the economically disadvantaged lower classes, but also the lower 
middle classes7 to oppose Europeanized equality to counterbalance a feeling or status 
threat.8 
                                                 
 
6 Source: https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=edat_lfs_9911&lang=en (last access: 
02.10.2019). 
7 Unfortunately, we do not rely on indicators measuring status anxiety, so we can only test the structural 
component of this argument. 
8 The extent to which people view immigrants as a threat may also depend on a specific economic sector 
they work in and on their job, which they believe to be particularly susceptible to EU migration (Ferrera 
and Pellegrata, 2018). As our dataset does not include respective indicators, we are not able to test for 
these effects. 
Jürgen Gerhards, Holger Lengfeld, Clara Dilger: Contested European Citizenship: Results from a 13 Coun-
try Survey 
 
 
Ferrera and Pellegata (2018) argue that attitudes toward EU migrants are not only 
shaped by objective status positions, but also by situational and relational factors, like 
temporally relative deprivation and trans-EU experiences. The second factor refers to 
the degree of familiarity and interactions with people from other countries. The au-
thors assume that people who are in contact with foreigners are more likely to support 
the idea of open European borders (see also Recci 2015; Díez Medrano et al. 2019; Recci 
et al. 2019). This argumentation is in line with the so-called ‘contact hypothesis’, which 
states that people who have a more regular contact with foreigners empathized with 
their situation more. Based on this, we expect a more positive point of view toward 
migrants and towards the provision of equal rights for EU migrants among those with 
more transnational experiences and contact with foreigners (Allport, 1979; Callens et 
al., 2015; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2008; Schlueter and Wagner, 2008). 
(1b) Macro-level: As stated above, mobility within the EU mainly occurs from poorer to 
richer countries. Accordingly, the salience and politicization around the consequences 
of intra-EU migration are likely to be higher in more affluent countries, which attract 
more immigrants. Vasilopoulou and Talving (2018) revealed an effect of a country’s 
economic affluence on citizens’ attitudes towards intra-EU mobility, by affecting their 
individual utilitarian calculations and affective considerations. Apart from discussions 
about employment and labor market issues, the authors expect ’concerns over redis-
tributive politics, provision of public services, access to welfare, and competition for 
the collective goods’ (Vasilopoulou and Talving, 2018: 6). Following these considera-
tions, we expect the approval of Europeanized equality to be higher in less affluent 
countries, whose citizens are less concerned about these issues. 
Competition on the labor market not only influences low-skilled workers, but is de-
pendent on the composition of the migrant population. Mayda (2006) argues, that in 
countries, where immigrants on average possess higher skills than nationals, the high-
skilled nationals oppose immigration more strongly than they do in countries where 
immigrants are on average less educated than the national population. This assump-
tion is supported by the finding that highly skilled nationals are more opposed toward 
skilled migration than individuals with a low educational level (Facchini and Mayda 
2012).9 We assume that this interaction of individual and context characteristics is ap-
plicable to EU citizens’ attitudes toward equal rights. Accordingly, we expect that low-
skilled nationals will show a stronger opposition toward European citizenship in 
countries where the EU migrant population is on average less skilled than the national 
population. To test this assumption, we interacted the macro-structural indicator for 
the difference of educational composition between the national and EU migrant pop-
ulation with the individual educational level. 
                                                 
 
9 In contrast to this finding, other authors show that high-skilled migrants are more favorable towards 
all nationals, and that high-skilled nationals are less opposed to migration, regardless of the immigrant’s 
skill level (Hainmüller and Hiscox 2007; 2010). 
BSSE Working Paper No. 40 
 
 
(2) Ideational factors: Several authors argue that ideational factors have a special signif-
icance when trying to explain attitudes towards migrants (Dixon et al., 2018; Ferrera 
and Pellegrata, 2018; Ford and Lowles, 2016; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014). 
(2a) Micro-level: We hypothesize that a person’s attitude towards Europeanized equal-
ity is impacted by their general stance towards migrants. On the one hand, there are 
people who perceive migrants’ ways of life, values, and skills as an enrichment for 
their country and its culture. This may hold true for citizens with cosmopolitan values. 
Yet, there are also people rejecting this notion and seeing migrants as a threat to their 
own way of life (Ciornei and Recchi, 2017; Helbling and Teney, 2015; Teney et al., 
2014). By relying on prejudice research, we expect that people who believe that immi-
grants enrich the cultural life of their country would also support European citizenship 
(Ivarsflaten, 2005). Additionally, people’s affectual ties to the nation-state and other 
collectives should also influence attitudes towards European citizenship: Those who 
exclusively identify with their nation are assumed to be more skeptical towards Euro-
peanized equality than people who identify with Europe. This corresponds to Hooghe 
and Marks’ (2004) argument stating that people who exclusively hold national identi-
ties are more Euroskeptical, whereas a European identity goes along with higher sup-
port for European integration. Lastly, political ideology might play a role. Many citi-
zens’ basic political orientations can be projected onto a left-right political scale. As 
left-wing ideologies are more connected with ideas of equality, solidarity, and inter-
nationalism (Fuchs and Klingemann, 1990), we assume that people who identify as 
left-wing would be more strongly in favor of equal rights for all European citizens than 
people from the political center. Meanwhile, we expect the inverse effect for right-wing 
people’s stances on the topic. Among other things, the idea that citizens should enjoy 
privileges not enjoyed by non-citizens forms one part of the multiple ideas that consti-
tute right-wing ideologies (Nickerson and Louis, 2008; Sides and Citrin, 2007). 
(2b) Macro-level: When interpreting current affairs, citizens draw on the explanations 
provided in the national public discourse. Most importantly, political parties, the gov-
ernment, and social movements provide reference frames by communicating their po-
litical opinions. This process of interpreting political topics is also known as ‘cueing’ 
(Gilens and Murakawa, 2002; Green et al., 2002; Hooghe and Marks, 2005). Using the 
example of the ‘EU integration’ topic, Leonard Ray (2003) as well as Gary Marks and 
Marco R. Steenbergen (2004) showed that elite’s cues have a strong effect on public 
opinion. Moreover, Steenbergen and colleagues (2007) provided evidence that the cue-
ing effect is stronger for extremist than for mainstream parties, as extremist parties 
tend to represent a certain opinion on a single issue only. In the case of far-right parties, 
literature suggests that a central ideological trait of this party family is nativism, which 
‘combines nationalism with xenophobia in that it calls for states to comprise only mem-
bers of the native group and considers non-native elements to be fundamentally 
threatening to the monocultural nation-state’ (Golder, 2016, p. 480; compare Mudde, 
2007). Moreover, the refugee crisis has unquestionably been the cause of a highly con-
troversial debate between political parties within and between European countries 
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about issues of migration. Although the debates about intra-EU migration and the ac-
ceptance of refugees refer to different legal frameworks, some studies show that peo-
ple’s attitudes do not differentiate much between different forms of immigration or 
groups of immigrants (McLaren, 2001; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007). A study con-
ducted by Harteveld et al. (2018) suggests that immigration of refugees into the EU led 
to an increase of Euroskeptic attitudes. As another example, in a natural experiment 
on several islands in the Aegean Sea Hangartner et al. (2018) show that the exposure 
to a higher inflow of refugees leads to increased hostility not only towards refugees, 
but also towards immigrants in general. Accordingly, we expect that the more the po-
litical elites and parties operate using xenophobic rhetoric, the more likely it is that 
people view migration as a threat. 
 
Data and methods 
Our analyses are based on the data from the original Transnational European Solidarity 
Survey (TESS), conducted in 13 European countries, comprising Austria, Cyprus, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slo-
vakia, Spain, and Sweden.10 The basic population were nationals living in private 
households and eligible to vote in the national parliament elections of the respective 
survey country. Interviews were conducted using computer-assisted telephone inter-
views (CATI). The final sample consists of 12,500 respondents with approximately 
1,000 respondents per country (500 in Cyprus because of its smaller population size). 
The fieldwork was carried out by Kantar TNS from the 6th of June to the 15th of No-
vember, 2016. Further information on the survey methodology can be found in Table 
A.1 in the appendix, and all item wordings and recodings of here used variables are 
shown in Table A.2 in the appendix.11 
The survey included three items to measure the approval of equal civil, political and 
social rights, where respondents were asked whether they totally disagree, tend to disa-
gree, tend to agree or totally agree to the following statements: 
There are people from other countries of the European Union who would like to live 
in [COUNTRY], these are so called ‘EU migrants’. Please tell me to what extent you 
agree or disagree with the following statements about these EU migrants: 
 EU migrants should be allowed to work in [COUNTRY], even if it becomes more diffi-
cult for some [CITIZENS OF COUNTRY] to find a job. 
                                                 
 
10 The TESS survey was conducted in a cooperation between two research groups: One is the interna-
tional research project Solidarity in Europe: Empowerment, Social Justice and Citizenship (SOLIDUS), which 
was funded by the European Commission within the Horizon 2020 Framework (Grant Agreement 
649489). The other is the research group Horizontal Europeanization, which was funded by the German 
Research Foundation (DFG) (FOR 1539). 
11 For more details about the survey, see also Gerhards et al. 2019) 
BSSE Working Paper No. 40 
 
 
 EU migrants living in my municipality should be allowed to vote in local elections, even 
if their votes are decisive for the outcome of the elections.  
 EU migrants living in [COUNTRY] should receive the same social security benefits as 
[CITIZENS OF COUNTRY].12 
To avoid a bias towards higher approval, the first two items are formulated in a rather 
restricted way in that they refer to the idea of equality under constrained conditions. 
By including the potential negative consequences of the notion of European citizen-
ship, we tried to ascertain which values people ‘really’ believe in. As all three rights 
are constitutive of the general concept of European citizenship, we calculated a sum-
mated index and rescaled it to the original scale (1 – 4). We ran a principal component 
factor analysis, which confirmed that all items load on one latent factor (results not 
shown but available on request), with Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.75.13 
To measure the socioeconomic status, we used the respondent’s employment status (1 
unemployed; 2 not in labor force/retired; 3 in education; 4 working) and occupational class 
(1 service classes; 2 routine non-manuals; 3 skilled workers/technicians; 4 self-employed; 5 un-
skilled workers), which was coded according to the Erikson/Goldthorpe/Portocarero 
class scheme (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992). The educational attainment was meas-
ured by the highest educational degree of the respondent, based on national educa-
tional system’s scales, recoded according to the European Social Survey ES-ISCED 
2010-2014 scale (European Social Survey, 2018) and summarized into three categories: 
low (none/lower secondary), middle (middle and higher secondary) and high (tertiary). We 
operationalize the degree of transnational experiences and contact with foreigners by 
asking the respondents whether they have regular contact with people from other 
countries and whether they have ever lived abroad for three months or longer. 
We measured ideational factors by using three items: Firstly, cosmopolitanism, oper-
ationalized by the question whether the respondent believes that foreigners enrich the 
culture of their home country (1 totally disagree; 2 tend to disagree; 3 tend to agree; 4 totally 
agree). Secondly, the political self-placement on the right-left scale, rescaled into five 
ordinal categories (1 left; 2 moderate left; 3 center; 4 moderate right; 5 right) and lastly, the 
identification with the nation-state, operationalized by a respondent’s exclusive na-
tional identification (denial of a European identity). As control variables on the indi-
vidual level we inserted the respondents age (in 10 years) and sex (0 male; 1 female). 
                                                 
 
12 According to the social rights item, we did not specify potential ‘costs’ to the item. Different to the 
labor market access and the right to vote, access to social right is directly linked to a monetarized good 
(amount of benefits) which is distributed among the respective population living in a country. Thus, a 
further specification of the stimulus was not appropriate. 
13 Additionally, we calculated the reliability coefficient for each country and conducted a confirmatory 
factor analysis of the three items by country. The values of Cronbach’s Alpha for most countries are 
acceptable (>0.7), while two countries almost reach this threshold (Sweden = 0.69; Netherlands = 0.67) 
and only one country has a questionable value of 0.6 (Portugal). Since the items load on one factor in 
each country, we accept this scale to be sufficiently reliable. 
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The affluence of a country was operationalized by the country’s gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) 2015 per capita in 1,000 €. The measurement of political cues by elites pre-
sented a more complicated task. As we were not in a position to carry out a media 
content analysis, we could only coarsely measure the concept empirically. We deter-
mined the strength of the xenophobic discourse in a country by measuring the propor-
tion of votes in the most recent general elections for parties that were unequivocally 
against migration and refugees. The greater these parties’ representation in their re-
spective parliaments, the greater their influence on public discourse and in turn on 
voters. Studies by Moshe Semyonov and colleagues (2006) and by Andrea Bohman 
(2011) have indicated the existence of a relation between the expression of reservations 
against migrants and the presence of politically influential right-wing populist parties. 
Finally, the difference in the educational composition between the national population 
and EU migrants is calculated by subtracting the share of low-skilled people (lower 
secondary degree or lower) in a country from the respective share in the EU migrant 
population of that country. Positive (negative) values indicate accordingly, that the 
prevalence of low educational degrees is higher (lower) in the group of EU migrants. 
14 
We first calculated relative frequencies15 for the approval of Europeanized equality by 
country (for bivariate descriptive analyses of the approval of European citizenship 
rights and the independent variables see appendix Table A.3). For the multivariate 
analysis, we calculated stepwise-expanded fixed-effect linear regression models with 
the European citizenship index as the dependent variable. The full model results are 
presented in the form of a coefficient plot. The exact numbers, country-dummies and 
stepwise models (control variables, socioeconomic factors and ideational factors 
added separately to the model) are displayed in Table A.4 (appendix). To compare the 
explanatory power of the different models, we compare the within- and between-var-
iances of the models. 
To examine the country-level effects, we applied the two-step regression (TSR) ap-
proach to our analyses. A TSR approach consists of two regression steps: The first step 
is conducted at the individual level and the second at the country level. The coefficients 
from the first step constitute the dependent variables in the second step. In this case, 
the first step was a pooled OLS regression with robust standard errors. The model 
included dummy variables for all countries (Spain as reference category), as well as 
the previously specified independent variables and the control variables from the in-
dividual level. The country dummies represent country fixed effects. In a second step, 
we took the values of the unstandardized coefficients from the pooled OLS regression 
                                                 
 
14 Unfortunately, there was no data available for Poland and Slovakia, reducing our country-sample to 
eleven. 
15 For all descriptive analyses, sampling weights are used, adjusting the data in terms of age, gender, 
occupational status, region (nuts 2) and employment status, as well as country size in comparative anal-
yses. 
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as the dependent variable and macro indicators as independent variables and ran OLS 
regressions at the country level to examine the effects of country characteristics. As 13 
(resp. eleven) countries is not a sufficient number of cases to interpret the coefficients 
and p-values in terms of statistical inference, the results are presented in the form of 
scatterplots combined with regression lines.16 These plots visualize the relationship be-
tween the macro factors and the support for equal rights in every country, controlling 
for composition of individual characteristics. 
 
Results 
As Figure 117 reveals, overall 56 percent of EU citizens support the idea that EU for-
eigners and national citizens should be treated equally. In eight out of 13 countries, the 
data indicates a slight majority in favor of European citizenship, with approval rates 
between 51 and 63 percent. Only in Portugal and Spain, a vast majority of over 70 
percent approves of Europeanized equality. In contrast, citizens from Hungary, Slo-
vakia, and Cyprus do not support the notion of a Europeanized equality. While the 
general trend slightly leans toward the acceptance of Europeanized equality, results 
show strong country differences. Compared to results of a previous study in which we 
used similar items, the approval rates have declined in the three countries that are part 
of both samples (Germany, Poland, and Spain; Gerhards and Lengfeld, 2015). This 
finding indicates that our considerations about the impact of contextual changes (fi-
nancial and political crises, increased migration and the rise of Euroskeptic parties) on 
the support for European citizenship might be valid. For a serious test of this assump-
tion, however, one would need panel data. The country differences in approval rates 
could be explained either by differences in composition between the countries, regard-
ing certain individual-level factors like education or ideational factors, or by macro-
level differences between the countries. We will further examine this in the next step 
of the analysis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
16 Moreover, due to the low number of countries, we decided to only include one explanatory variable 
per regression in the second step. 
17 In Figure 1, we adjusted the depiction of the approval index. The index here represents the rate of 
responses in every answer category (i.e. fully agree, tend to agree, tend to disagree, fully disagree) for 
all three items across the total number of responses for all three items. For example, 56 percent of re-
sponses fell into the category ‘fully agree’ or ‘tend to agree’ for all three items. 
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Figure 1: Average approval of European citizenship by country (%) 
 
 
Note: Source: TESS 2016; own calculations; relative frequencies (weighted) 
 
Figure 2 shows the results of the full linear fixed-effect regression model. The variables 
concerning the contact hypothesis show significant effects in the expected direction. 
The results of the three socio-structural factors are mixed: While the employment sta-
tus shows no significant effect on the attitudes towards European citizenship, we find 
significant negative effects of the lower occupational classes (in reference to the service 
classes). The social class position indicator shows that both the lower middle class 
(skilled workers/technicians) and the lower class (unskilled workers and agricul-
ture/farmers?) exhibit a significantly lower approval of European citizenship than the 
upper and lower service classes. Thus, our expectations concerning the higher opposi-
tion of the lower classes and lower middle class can be empirically confirmed. Further-
more, the respondents with lower and medium educational achievement (in compari-
son with the high education group) approve of European citizenship to a lesser ex-
tent.18 
                                                 
 
18 We interpret education as a structural variable and as a form of human capital that eases access to 
lower positions in the job market, meaning that people with a higher education should feel less threat-
ened economically by migration. However, higher education can also lead to a greater degree of cogni-
tive mobilization, a deeper knowledge of the wider world, and a higher acceptance of foreign cultures 
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Figure 2: Coefficient plot – Dependent variable: Europeanized equality index 
 
 
Note: Source: TESS 2016; own calculations; average marginal effects (based on logistic regression) 
 
While these effects are significant, they seem to be rather small, compared to the idea-
tional factors’ effects. Respondents who think that their country’s culture is enriched 
by foreigners show a significantly more favorable attitude towards European citizen-
ship, as well as people who place themselves on the left side of the political spectrum 
(in contrast to the political center). Opposite effects are shown for people who classify 
themselves as politically right, and who hold an exclusively national identity. Overall, 
value orientations turn out to be more important than structural factors for the expla-
nation of attitudes towards European citizenship. This conclusion is also supported by 
the higher increase of the R² when adding the ideational factors to the model (+ 12.6 
percent) in comparison to the increase when adding the structural factors (+ 1.7 per-
cent) (see Table A.4 in the appendix). 
Table A.4 (appendix) gives detailed information about effects of the country dummies 
and the results for the explained variances, both within and between countries. The 
comparison of the between-country variance between regression models shows that 
the structural variables do not lead to an increase in the explained variance on the 
                                                 
 
(Knutsen, 2010; Merkel, 2017). Therefore, one should be careful when interpreting the results of the 
educational attainment as a structural factor only. 
Age (in 10 years)
Sex (Ref.: Male)
Stay abroad (Ref.: No)
Contact with foreigners (Ref.: No)
Unemployed
Not in labour force/retired
In education
Routine non-manuals
Skilled workers/technicians
Self-employed
Unskilled workers
Low
Middle
Cosmopolitanism
Left
Moderate Left
Moderate Right
Right
Exclusively national identity (Ref.: European)
 Employment status (Ref.: Working)
 Occupational class (Ref.: Service classes)
 Educational level (Ref.: High)
 
 Political Placement (Ref.: Centre)
 
-.4 -.2 0 .2 .4
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country-level, in contrast to the ideational variables (10 percent increase in the be-
tween-variance). However, all country dummies (except Portugal) are still highly sig-
nificant in comparison to the reference country Spain. This brings us to the conclusion 
that country differences are partly caused by differences in a country’s composition 
regarding value orientations, but also by other individual- or country-level factors not 
included in our analysis. 
To test for country-level factors, we applied the two-step-regression approach and 
plotted the results as scatterplots. Figure 3 shows that GDP (per capita) does not have 
an impact on a country’s level of acceptance of Europeanized equality. However, the 
share of anti-immigrant votes in the last election shows a strong negative association, 
and a p-value under 0.01, despite the low number of countries. Because Hungary con-
stitutes an outlier in terms of the share of anti-immigrant votes, we ran an additional 
regression without this case, with a similar result (depicted by the dashed line).19 How-
ever, when interpreting these results, we must consider that we are not able to make 
assumptions about the direction of causality. Liesbet Hooghe (2007) spoke of a top-
down process of elites influencing the attitudes of regular citizens. In contrast to this 
interpretation, this could also occur as a bottom-up process. The strength of anti-im-
migration parties would then result from the proportion of citizens who are predis-
posed to reject Europeanized equality and who vote for anti-immigration parties pre-
cisely for this reason. We assume that both of these theories are correct and that this 
thereby constitutes a dynamic, self-reinforcing process, even if we are unable to verify 
this empirically. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
19 These results are confirmed by the goodness-of-fit measures (Table A.4 in the appendix): The GDP 
per capita has no explanatory power, whereas the variance explained by the share of anti-immigration 
party votes is very high with a R² of 51 percent.  
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Figure 3: Scatter plots and regression lines of country-coefficients and macro-variables  
 
 
Note: Source: TESS 2016; own calculations; average marginal effects of country-dummies (based on logistic regres-
sion); OLS-regression lines 
 
To examine the context of educational composition, we firstly analyzed the relation-
ship between educational difference and acceptance rates. The pattern supports our 
assumption that the acceptance of European citizenship is lower in countries, where 
EU-migrants are on average less skilled than the national population, than in countries 
with more highly skilled immigrants. Secondly, we examined the association between 
the coefficients of the dummy variables of having a low or medium educational level 
with the country composition regarding educational attainment of EU migrants (not 
depicted). The country-patterns do not match the theoretical predictions and show no 
considerable differences of the influence of education on the attitudes toward equal 
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rights between the countries.20 Moreover, the explanation of country differences by 
using relatively vague macro-indices has certain limitations, because these variables 
do not take national historic developments and particularities into account (Mahoney 
2004). 
 
Conclusion 
European citizenship consisting of equal economic, social, and political rights for all 
EU citizens is an institutionalized and constitutive element of the European Union. We 
assume that the legitimacy of this European citizenship has come under pressure in 
recent years as a result of the different crises the EU had to face, and the increased 
numbers of EU migrants. Based on a survey conducted in 13 EU member states in 2016 
we examined to what extent EU citizens support the notion that citizens from other 
European countries should enjoy the same rights as nationals, and how one can ex-
plain differences in attitudes towards European citizenship within and between coun-
tries. Overall, only 56 percent of EU citizens support the idea that EU foreigners and 
national citizens should be treated equally. In addition, we find remarkable differences 
between the countries. Whereas in eight countries a majority is in favor of European 
citizenship, people from Hungary, Slovakia, and the Republic of Cyprus do not sup-
port the notion of a Europeanized equality.  
Multivariate analysis indicates that ideational factors on the individual and country 
level have a strong impact on attitudes towards Europeanized equality, whereas struc-
tural factors that are related to individuals’ and a country’s socioeconomic position are 
only of minor importance. Anti-cosmopolitan attitudes, political right-wing orienta-
tions, identification with the nation-state and the strength of anti-immigrant parties in 
a country are the most important explaining factors. One limitation of these results is 
the fact that the country-level analysis is based on a sample of 13 EU countries out of 
28, meaning that both the explanatory power for the European Union as a whole, as 
well as the effects themselves, should be treated as preliminary results, which have to 
be further examined in future studies. Moreover, the explanation of country differ-
ences by using relatively vague macro-indices has certain limitations, because these 
variables do not take national historic developments and particularities into account 
(Mahoney 2004). 
                                                 
 
20 In further analyses, we tested additional macro-variables (increase/decrease (2014-2018) and share 
(2018) of EU migrants, share of social spending of GDP, share of people who find it difficult to live on 
current income), but we could not find any significant effects. Additionally, we calculated cross-level 
interaction effects between an individual’s structural traits (occupational class and educational attain-
ment) and the macro-conditions of the country. In contrast to Vasilopoulou and Talving (2018), we could 
not find any interaction between the individual position and the affluence of their country. Results are 
available on request. 
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Finally, in comparison to the results of a survey conducted by XXX in 2009 the ap-
proval rates have declined in the countries that are part of both samples. This result 
may indicate that the different EU crises, the increased migration and the rise of Eu-
roskeptic parties have negatively influenced support for European citizenship. How-
ever, we cannot directly test this connection, as panel data is required for that. As EU 
citizenship has been a core element of European integration since 1951, our findings 
may indicate that the EU is not only facing an institutional but also a legitimacy crisis.21 
However, the results of our study seem to contradict other empirical findings. Vasi-
lopoulou and Talving (2018) found a much higher approval rate of 82 percent for free-
dom of movement. The different findings might be traced back to differences in how 
attitudes were measured. First, the Eurobarometer item used by Vasilopoulou and 
Talving specifies general, un-conditioned attitudes, which may be conflated by social 
desirability. The items used in our survey are formulated in a more realistic manner as 
they consider the potential (negative) consequences of institutionalization of European 
citizenship. Second, whereas Vasilopoulou and Talving (2018) investigated only one 
dimension of EU citizenship, namely to work in another EU country, our study has 
taken all three dimensions of European citizenship into account.  
Although our study builds upon a cross sectional design only, we assume that the re-
cent crises have led to the de-legitimization of European citizenship, one of the core 
and constitutive elements of the European Union. Moreover, the most important fac-
tors affecting attitudes toward EU citizenship are ideational ones: Political right wing 
orientations, nationalism, and anti-cosmopolitan attitudes. Thus, classical EU policies 
focusing on improvement of economic living conditions, including EU wide social pol-
icy initiatives, do not seem to be effective measures to strengthen the legitimacy of EU 
citizenship. Seen from this point of view, the EU faces a serious dilemma, as it has no 
suitable antidote. 
 
  
                                                 
 
21 Our concept of legitimacy refers to Max Weber’s (1985) notion of legitimacy. Weber argues that legit-
imacy is ultimately produced by citizens’ beliefs in the legitimacy of an institution. However, one has to 
keep in mind that our study refers to 13 member states only, whereas the European Union currently 
consists of 28 countries. Although it is not possible to generalize our results to all EU member states, we 
have no reason to believe that the 13 countries do not reflect the range of possible country differences 
between the member states. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A.1: Survey methodology of the TESS survey 
A. SURVEY DESIGN 
Population Adult population, eligible to vote in national elections of the selected 
countries, who are residents in private households and available by 
phone (landline or mobile). 
Interview mode Computer assisted telephone interviews (CATI) 
Execution of 
fieldwork 
Kantar TNS (formerly known as infratest dimap) Berlin, a public opinion 
research company specialising in electoral and political research, carried 
out the survey in the thirteen countries in collaboration with national, af-
filiated institutes belonging to the TNS group. The fieldwork was coordi-
nated and conducted by TNS Triple C Centre in Brussels from 6 June to 15 
November 2016. 
Target of net in-
terviews 
12.500 interviews in total, with 1.000 per country except for Cyprus (500) 
Average inter-
view duration 
(planned) 
25 to 30 minutes 
B. SAMPLING DESIGN 
Contact method Landline/mobile mix of the gross sample which reflects the current stand-
ard proportions of Eurobarometer Flash. 
Sampling Random digit dialing (RDD) in all countries except Sweden:  
The procedure to generate a RDD sampling frame is as follows: Listed 
telephone numbers from a recent point in time are drawn from a data-
base. The database that is not limited to single number providers and can 
be used to identify area codes and active blocks of telephone numbers as 
a part of the process of creating a RDD database. In this process, the two 
last digits of the numbers are deleted and replaced by 00 to 99. By this, 
also numbers not listed have a positive probability of being selected. 
In Sweden the sample frame was different compared to the other coun-
tries, because an address register containing 90 % of all Swedish aged 16 
years or more exists there. In this register, not only the landline numbers 
are listed, but also all registered mobile numbers (except prepaid cards). 
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Due to the high percentage of registered persons a random sample of per-
sons drawn based on this register. This means that the Swedish sample 
was a sample of individuals and not of households as it was for landline 
numbers in the other countries. 
Stratification NUTS 2 regions 
Selection of re-
spondent 
If the number selected was a mobile number, the target person for the 
interview was the owner of the mobile phone. On the contrary, if the 
number was a landline number, the target person could have been every 
adult person living in the household eligible to vote. Therefore, in this 
case in a second step the target person had to be selected by chance. This 
was done using the last birthday method to identify the respondent 
among all persons eligible to vote in the household. 
C. FIELDWORK EXECUTION AND RESULTS 
 Fieldwork pe-
riod 
2016 
Number of inter-
views 
Average inter-
view length 
(minutes) 
Response rate22 
(in %) 
Austria 
June 6 - July 6 
1.010 30 1.3 
Cyprus 
June 7 - June 22 
500 23 2.7 
France 
10 Oct - 5 Nov 
1002 27 5.3 
Germany 
June 6 - July 1 
1.001 28 3.0 
Greece 
June 9 - July 1 
1.000 24 5.1 
Hungary 
June 6 - June 30 
1.001 29 9.5 
Ireland 
10 Oct - 14 Nov 
1.000 25 2.6 
Netherlands 
June 6 - July 5 
1.000 39 5.5 
Poland 
June 6 - July 1 
1.000 27 4.4 
Portugal 
June 6 - July 1 
1.000 27 7.7 
Slovakia 
June 6 - July 5  
1.000 29 7.6 
Spain 
June 6 - July 6 
1.001 26 2.3 
Sweden 
June 7 - July 13 
1.000 32 6.1 
D. WEIGHTING 
The weights took into account the national landline/mobile ratios, but factored in the possible 
response selectivity. The sample structure was compared to the actual population structure 
                                                 
 
22 Share of completed interviews of the adjusted gross sample. 
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along age, gender, labour market status, regions (NUTS II), employment status (known from 
Eurostat 2016 and the Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) database), and 
the highest level of completed education (measured with the ES-ISCED 2010-2014 scale from 
the European Social Survey (ESS Round 7: European Social Survey 2016)). 
Table A.2: Item wording and recoding of variables 
Variables Range Item Wording 
A. EUROPEAN CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS 
EU migrants 1-4 ‘There are people from other countries of the European Union who would 
like to live in [COUNTRY], these are so called ‘EU migrants’. Please tell 
me to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements 
about these EU migrants.’ 
(1 totally agree, 2 tend to agree, 3 tend to disagree, 4 totally disagree) 
   EU migrants living in [COUNTRY] should receive the same so-
cial security benefits as [CITIZENSOFCOUNTRY]. 
   EU migrants should be allowed to work in [COUNTRY], even if 
it becomes more difficult for some [CITIZENSOFCOUNTRY] to 
find a job. 
   EU migrants living in my municipality should be allowed to vote 
in local elections, even if their votes are decisive for the outcome 
of the elections. 
  Recoding:  
Approval rates (1=1, 2=1, 3=0, 4=0) 
Index (1=4, 2=3, 3=2, 4=1), sum of all three items divided by three 
B. SOCIETAL AND POLITICAL VALUES 
Political Place-
ment 
1-5 In political matters people talk of "the left" and "the right". How would 
you place your views on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means the left and 
10 means the right? 
  Recoded into 5 groups (1-2=Left; 3-5=Moderate Left;6=Centre; 7-9=Moderate 
Right;10-11=Right) 
Society: Culture 
Enriched 
 
1-4 I will now read to you several statements about society. Please tell me to 
what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements: 
 (1 totally agree, 2 tend to agree, 3 tend to disagree, 4 totally disa-
gree) [COUNTRY]s cultural life is generally enriched by people 
coming to live here from other countries.  
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 Recoded (1=4, 2=3, 3=2, 4=1) 
Identification 0,1 Some people think of themselves as [NATIONALITY], others as Europe-
ans, and others as citizens of the world. What about you?  
(1 Yes, 2 No) 
 Do you feel [NATIONALITY]? 
 Do you feel European? 
  Recoded (Exclusive national identity (1) = “Do you feel [NATIONALITY]?”=1 
& “Do you feel European?”=2; Integrated European Identity (2) = “Do you feel 
European?”=1) 
C. SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES 
Employment sta-
tus 
1-7 Which of the following applies to your current employment situation? Are you… 
  1 Full time employee (30 hours a week or more). 
2 Part time employee (less than 30 hours a week). 
3 Self employed. 
4 Retired/pensioned. 
5 Housewife, doing housework or otherwise not employed. 
6 Student. 
7 Unemployed. 
  Recoded (7=1, 4-5=2, 6=3, 1-3=4) 
Class according 
to “Erikson-
Goldthorpe-Por-
tocarero” (EGP) 
1-9 What is your current occupation? 
1 Employed professional (employed doctor, lawyer, accountant, 
architect). 
2 General management, director or top management (managing 
directors, director general, other director). 
3 Middle management, other management (department head, 
junior manager, teacher, technician). 
4 Employed position, working mainly at a desk. 
5 Employed position, not at a desk but travelling (salesmen, 
driver, etc.) 
6 Employed position, not at a desk, but in a service job (hospital, 
restaurant, police, fireman, etc.). 
7 Supervisor. 
8 Skilled manual worker. 
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9 Other (unskilled) manual worker, servant. 
  Recoded referring to EGP class scheme (Service classes (1)=1-3; Routine non-
manual (2)=3-6; Skilled workers/technicians (3)=7-8; Self-employed (4); Un-
skilled manual workers & agriculture (5)=9 
  Remarks: The category “Self-employed 4)” was defined by another variable indi-
cation the respondent’s employment situation (see above); If respondent was cur-
rently not part of the active labor force, we asked them a similar question to indi-
cate their prior occupation. 
Education 1-3 What is the highest level of education or vocational training you have 
achieved? 
  1 No formal qualification, only primary education. 
2 Lower secondary education. 
3 Upper secondary vocational education. 
4 Upper secondary education. 
5 Post secondary education, advanced vocational education below 
bachelor's degree level. 
6 Medium duration higher education at university or polytechnic 
college. 
7 Long higher education at university or polytechnic college. 
8 Other. 
  Recoded (Low (1) =1, 2; Medium (2) = 3-5; High (3) = 6, 7) 
Sex 0,1 self-generated by interviewer, 1 male, 2 female 
  Recoded (0 = Male; 1 =  Female) 
Age  18-95 Can you tell me your year of birth, please? 
  Recoded (Age= 2016 - year of birth) 
Contact with For-
eigners 
0,1 
 
 
Do you have regular contact to people from other countries in your circle 
of friends and acquaintances? 
1 No, none 
2 Yes, but only with foreigners living in [country of resp.] 
3 Yes, but only with foreigners living abroad 
4 Yes, with foreigners living in [country of resp.] and to foreigners 
living abroad  
  Recoded (0 = 1,3; 1 = 2,4) 
Stay Abroad 1,2 Have you ever lived abroad for three months or longer, either for private 
or professional reasons?  
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1 Yes 
2 No 
  Recoded (0 = 2) 
E. MACRO VARIABLES 
GDP 2015 11.2-45.8 Gross Domestic Product per capita, 2015, in 1000 € 
  Source: Eurostat https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/national-accounts/data/data-
base?p_p_id=NavTreeport-
letprod_WAR_NavTreeportletprod_INSTANCE_Hx0U2oGtTuFV&p_p_lifecy
cle=0&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&p_p_col_id=column-
2&p_p_col_count=3 (last access 01.04.2019) 
Political Cueing 0-0.65 Share of anti-immigrant party shares  
 
  Coded like Hobolt & de Vries (2016) with data from 
http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/ 
 
Source: TESS 2016  
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Table A.3: Relative frequencies of independent variables by approval to different rights and 
index 
 Right to work Right to vote 
Right to social 
benefits 
Approval-In-
dex 
Total 56.8 50.8 63.1 56.9 
Contact to foreigners     
[0] No 53.7 49.0 59.3 54.0 
[1] Yes 67.3 61.0 68.7 65.7 
Lived abroad     
[0] No 59.6 54.6 64.2 59.5 
[1] Yes 70.1 61.9 67.4 66.5 
Employment status     
[1] Unemployed 50.8 53.7 64.1 56.2 
[2] Not in labour force/retired 59.8 54.7 64.5 59.7 
[3] In education 78.0 68.3 69.6 72.0 
[4] Working 62.4 55.9 64.7 61.0 
Occupational class     
[1] Upper class (I) 68.2 58.9 67.6 64.9 
[2] Upper middle class (II) 67.5 59.2 65.9 64.2 
[3] Center middle class (IIIa) 61.2 54.7 64.5 60.1 
[4] Lower middle class (V & VI) 51.4 53.4 60.5 55.1 
[5] Self-employed (IVab & IVc) 59.2 49.3 60.2 56.2 
[6] Routine non-manual (IIIb) 63.3 55.2 66.8 61.8 
[7] Unskilled manual workers & 
agriculture 
57.5 59.0 64.8 60.3 
Educational attainment     
[1] Non- or primary 60.3 61.2 71.4 64.2 
[2] Lower secondary 54.7 58.6 63.7 59.0 
[3] Middle secondary 50.3 45.4 52.7 49.4 
[4] Higher secondary 62.8 55.6 66.7 61.8 
[5] Tertiary 75.5 63.9 73.4 70.9 
Foreigners enrich culture     
[1] Totally disagree 31.9 33.2 41.6 35.6 
[2] Tend to disagree 47.6 42.5 54.6 48.2 
[3] Tend to agree 63.0 57.2 64.7 61.6 
[4] Totally agree 76.8 69.0 77.7 74.5 
Identity     
[1] Only National 40.4 39.1 46.7 42.1 
[2] European Identity 66.9 60.2 69.3 65.5 
Political self-assessment     
[1] Left 70.9 71.2 78.1 73.4 
[2] Moderate Left 75.5 69.5 76.0 73.7 
[3] Center 57.4 54.1 61.3 57.6 
[4] Moderate Right 59.1 47.4 59.8 55.4 
[5] Right 39.6 35.0 48.4 40.9 
 
Source: TESS 2016; own calculations; n=9.698; Notes: relative frequencies (weighed)
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Table A4: Linear fixed-effect regression on the European citizenship approval index 
Index 
Model 
1 
 
Model 
2 
 
Model 
3 
 
Model 
4 
 
Age (in 10 years) 
-
0.02**
* 
(0.01) -0.01* (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 
Sex (Ref.: Male) 
-
0.08**
* 
(0.02) -0.08*** (0.02) -0.08*** (0.02) -0.09*** (0.02) 
Stay abroad (Ref.: No)   0.14*** (0.02) 0.10*** (0.02) 0.07*** (0.02) 
Contact with foreigners 
(Ref.: No) 
  0.21*** (0.02) 0.17*** (0.02) 0.11*** (0.02) 
Employment status  
(Ref.: Working) 
        
Unemployed     -0.07 (0.04) -0.07 (0.04) 
Not in labour force/re-
tired 
    -0.04 (0.03) -0.02 (0.02) 
In education     0.10 (0.06) -0.00 (0.05) 
Occupational class (Ref.: 
Service classes)  
        
Routine non-manuals     -0.06** (0.02) -0.04* (0.02) 
Skilled workers/tech-
nicians 
    -0.13*** (0.03) -0.10** (0.03) 
Self-employed     -0.11* (0.05) -0.07 (0.04) 
 Unskilled workers     -0.12** (0.04) -0.08* (0.04) 
Educational level (Ref. 
High) 
        
Low     -0.19*** (0.03) -0.08** (0.03) 
Middle     -0.18*** (0.02) -0.10*** (0.02) 
Cosmopolitanism       0.26*** (0.01) 
Political Placement (Ref.: 
Centre) 
        
Left       0.21*** (0.03) 
Moderate Left       0.22*** (0.02) 
Moderate Right       -0.06** (0.02) 
Right       -0.19*** (0.03) 
Identity: Exclusively na-
tional (Ref.: European) 
      -0.26*** (0.02) 
Country-Dummies (Ref. 
Spain) 
        
Netherlands 
-
0.48*** 
(0.04) -0.46*** (0.04) -0.50*** (0.04) -0.36*** (0.04) 
Germany 
-
0.31*** 
(0.04) -0.30*** (0.04) -0.32*** (0.04) -0.33*** (0.04) 
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Poland 
-
0.36*** 
(0.04) -0.33*** (0.04) -0.34*** (0.04) -0.18*** (0.04) 
Sweden 
-
0.67*** 
(0.04) -0.68*** (0.04) -0.70*** (0.04) -0.69*** (0.04) 
Greece 
-
0.51*** 
(0.05) -0.49*** (0.05) -0.51*** (0.05) -0.32*** (0.04) 
Hungary 
-
1.10*** 
(0.04) -1.04*** (0.04) -1.03*** (0.04) -0.92*** (0.04) 
Austria 
-
0.45*** 
(0.04) -0.47*** (0.04) -0.48*** (0.04) -0.40*** (0.04) 
Cyprus 
-
0.80*** 
(0.06) -0.85*** (0.06) -0.85*** (0.06) -0.58*** (0.06) 
Ireland 
-
0.35*** 
(0.04) -0.38*** (0.04) -0.40*** (0.04) -0.31*** (0.04) 
Portugal 
-
0.16*** 
(0.04) -0.15*** (0.04) -0.12** (0.04) 0.03 (0.04) 
Slovakia 
-
0.91*** 
(0.04) -0.89*** (0.04) -0.87*** (0.04) -0.69*** (0.04) 
France 
-
0.63*** 
(0.04) -0.63*** (0.04) -0.62*** (0.04) -0.54*** (0.04) 
Constant 3.35*** (0.04) 3.12*** (0.04) 3.26*** (0.05) 2.46*** (0.06) 
R2 0.11  0.13  0.14  0.27  
R2 within 0.00  0.03  0.04  0.19  
R2 between 0.28  0.16  0.16  0.26  
R2 overall 0.01  0.03  0.05  0.19  
 
Source: TESS 2016; own calculations; n=9.698; Notes: Linear regression with robust standard errors  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
